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98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1575 (2020)

Tully v. City of Wilmington: A Fundamental Right To Be Treated
Reasonably at Work *
Kevin Tully, a distinguished police corporal in Wilmington, North Carolina,
was rejected for a promotion because he outsmarted his advancement test—the
“correct” answers were based on outdated law, while Tully’s answers were upto-date. When Tully was denied an internal appeal of his test results, he turned
to the North Carolina Constitution for help. For the first time, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina interpreted article I, section 1 of the state constitution,
which guarantees to every North Carolinian the “enjoyment of the fruits of their
own labor,” to protect a fundamental right to pursue one’s chosen occupation in
the public sector as well as the private sector. Across America, public employees
suffer from stagnant wages, growing workloads, and political gamesmanship.
They are largely denied rights guaranteed to private employees by federal
employment and labor statutes and to other citizens by the federal Constitution.
This Recent Development shows how state courts can “step into the breach” by
extending similar state constitutional provisions to public employees.
This Recent Development makes three contributions. First, it defines the
contours of this often overlooked fundamental right protected by article I, section
1 by tracing the “fruits clause” from its adoption in 1868 to today, drawing a
single thread of reasoning from the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s
antiregulatory precedent to its most recent case, Tully v. City of Wilmington.
Second, it synthesizes precedential treatment of the fruits clause, outlining a
straightforward test for judges to evaluate future claims brought by public
employees under the clause. Third, it uses two examples—overworked school
social workers and counselors and nonconfidential sexual harassment reporting
policies for state legislative employees—to demonstrate how creative lawyers can
improve working conditions for public employees by litigating future cases under
the fruits clause.
In his now famous article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, former United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan called on
civil rights advocates to look beyond the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment
to state constitutions, which, too, are “font[s] of individual liberties.” 1 Brennan

* © 2020 James W. Whalen.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 491 (1977).
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criticized that, eight years after the Warren Court, 2 the U.S. Supreme Court
had “crippled” the protections of the federal Constitution, condoning “both
isolated and systematic violations of civil liberties” throughout the country. 3 In
such circumstances, he argued, the task of protecting civil rights falls to the
arbiters of state constitutional protections. 4
Justice Brennan’s depiction of crippled federal rights rings particularly
true for government employees. Over Brennan’s protests, the federal
Constitution’s guarantee of due process has not been meaningfully extended to
public employees, 5 and citizens may lose other fundamental rights simply by
being on the government’s payroll. 6
Luckily, the Supreme Court of North Carolina “step[ped] into the
breach” 7 in Tully v. City of Wilmington, 8 transforming an often-overlooked clause
of the North Carolina Constitution into a powerful protector of public
employee rights. Article I, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, which
recognizes an “inalienable right[]” to the “enjoyment of the fruits of their own
labor,” 9 had primarily been interpreted as a limit on the state’s economic
2. Chief Justice Earl Warren retired in 1969. The Warren Court, 1953–1969, SUP. CT. HIST.
SOC’Y,
https://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_court_warren.html
[https://perma.cc/FB7S6FWA].
3. Brennan, supra note 1, at 502–03 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (denying
federal habeas corpus relief for a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search violation when state courts
have considered the Fourth Amendment claim)). See generally Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976) (denying federal habeas corpus relief for alleged exclusion of African Americans from a grand
jury when the defendant failed to raise the issue in state court); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)
(holding law enforcement may publicly condemn individuals as criminals without due process); Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (denying federal equitable relief to plaintiffs injured by law enforcement
when named defendants “played no affirmative part in depriving . . . any constitutional rights”); Hicks
v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (holding that federal plaintiffs cannot challenge the constitutionality
of a criminal statute when no state criminal proceedings are yet pending against plaintiffs); O’Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (finding no case or controversy when the plaintiffs had not personally
suffered the constitutional violations alleged).
4. Brennan, supra note 1, at 503.
5. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997) (finding no Due Process Clause violation
when a police officer was suspended without pay after being charged, but not convicted, of a crime);
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972) (finding no Due Process Clause
violation when a state university declined to rehire a professor without a hearing); Cafeteria & Rest.
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 887, 899 (1961) (finding no Due Process Clause
violation when a short-order cook at a naval gun factory was fired without reason or a hearing). But see
McElroy, 367 U.S. at 900 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[This case’s] result in effect nullifies the
substantive right . . . not to be arbitrarily injured by Government.”).
6. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)
(holding that the First Amendment does not protect federal employees’ right to participate in campaign
management). But see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“[A] teacher’s exercise of
his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment.”).
7. Brennan, supra note 1, at 503.
8. 370 N.C. 527, 810 S.E.2d 208 (2018).
9. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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regulatory power in past cases. 10 However, in Tully, the court expanded its
interpretation to include a limit on government treatment of its own employees,
guaranteeing every public employee the fundamental right to “pursue his
chosen profession free from” unreasonable government interference. 11
Though the holding in Tully was limited to the facts in that case, this
Recent Development argues that the court’s reasoning recognizes a broad,
fundamental right for public employees to be treated reasonably by their
employers. Consequently, mistreated public employees who, except in rare
circumstances, 12 would have no recourse under the federal Constitution may
now seek relief under North Carolina law. Across the country, millions of public
employees are harassed, overworked, denied benefits, or terminated due to
unreasonable government actions or policies. 13 Rooted in an enumerated right
unique to the North Carolina Constitution but with sisters and brothers
throughout the United States, 14 Tully’s reasoning provides a roadmap for how
creative lawyers can win relief for public employees in state court.
This Recent Development proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly
summarizes the history of article I, section 1 and outlines the Supreme Court
of North Carolina’s decision in Tully. Section II.A defines the fundamental
right to “pursue [one’s] chosen profession,” 15 evoked in Tully, by analyzing how
it has been understood and protected in the state’s antiregulatory precedent.
Section II.B instructs courts how to identify and remedy when public employers
violate this fundamental right. Finally, Part III outlines two specific examples
of how this newly understood right can protect school counselors from being
overworked and government employees from sexual harassment.
I. TULLY V. CITY OF WILMINGTON
A.

History of the “Fruits Clause”

Unlike the federal Constitution, the North Carolina Constitution begins
with its Declaration of Rights. 16 Exceptionally concerned with government
10. See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
11. Tully, 370 N.C. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215.
12. See, e.g., Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1153 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the Constitution prohibits a public employer from revoking an occupational license and
disseminating negative information about an employee without due process).
13. See Mike Maciag, The Alarming Consequences of Police Working Overtime, GOVERNING:
FUTURE STS. & LOCALITIES (Oct. 2017), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justicesafety/gov-police-officers-overworked-cops.html [https://perma.cc/UG78-XHDY]; Katie Reilly, ‘I
Work 3 Jobs and Donate Blood Plasma To Pay the Bills.’ This Is What It’s Like To Be a Teacher in America,
TIME (Sept. 13, 2018), https://time.com/longform/teaching-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/A5JB4C3F].
14. See infra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
15. Tully, 370 N.C. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215.
16. N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–38.
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encroachment on individual liberties, North Carolina’s framers adopted the
declaration one day before adopting the state constitution itself 17 and refused to
ratify the U.S. Constitution until the Bill of Rights was passed. 18 Given the
primacy of individual liberty in the minds of the framers, North Carolina courts
have long recognized a “‘direct action under the State Constitution against state
officials for violation of rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights’ when
no other state law remedy is available.” 19
In 1868, North Carolina amended the beginning of its Declaration of
Rights to state that “all persons are . . . endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits
of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness.” 20 North Carolina adopted the
“fruits of their own labor” clause (“fruits clause”) in the same year the nation
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 21 The fruits
clause was adopted during Reconstruction and was “obviously grounded in the
history of an enslaved people obligated to work for the benefit of others but
unable to benefit for themselves.” 22
Despite the abolitionist origins of the fruits clause, North Carolina courts
have largely interpreted it as a libertarian limit on government economic
regulation, protecting “legitimate business, occupation, or trade” from
regulation that was not “reasonably necessary” for “the promotion or protection
of the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare.” 23 Under
the fruits clause, North Carolina courts have struck down regulations of private
businesses including photography, 24 real estate advertising, 25 companion escort
services, 26 and tow trucks. 27
In 1979, the Supreme Court of North Carolina expanded the fruits clause
to protect public employees in addition to private businesses. 28 In Presnell v.

17. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289–90 (1992).
18. Troy L. Kickler, North Carolina’s Ratification Debates Guaranteed Bill of Rights, N.C. HIST.
PROJECT,
https://northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/north-carolinas-ratification-debatesguaranteed-bill-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/SP77-VQ9J].
19. Tully, 370 N.C. at 533, 810 S.E.2d at 214 (quoting Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at
290).
20. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22. Mitch Kokai, Protecting the Fruits of College Athletes’ Labor, CAROLINA J. (Jan. 24, 2019, 4:02
AM), https://www.carolinajournal.com/opinion-article/protecting-the-fruits-of-college-athletes-labor/
[https://perma.cc/P38Q-CUPV] (quoting former Supreme Court of North Carolina Justice Bob Orr).
23. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 770, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1949).
24. Id.
25. N.C. Real Estate Licensing Bd. v. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. 8, 10, 13, 228 S.E.2d 493, 495–96
(1976).
26. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County., 83 N.C. App. 345, 353, 350 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1986).
27. King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367 N.C. 400, 408, 758 S.E.2d 364, 371 (2014).
28. Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 717–18, 260 S.E.2d 611, 612–13 (1979).
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Pell, 29 a public school principal fired an employee based on a false claim that the
employee had distributed liquor on school grounds. 30 Despite her employer’s
dishonesty, the employee had no recourse under state tort law because North
Carolina allows even bad faith terminations of at-will employees. 31 Still, the
court allowed the employee’s claims for defamation and wrongful termination
to proceed—while the termination itself may not have risen to a violation, the
principal’s false accusations could have unreasonably inhibited the employee’s
ability to find future employment in the private sector. 32 Though a strong first
step, the holding in Presnell was restrictive. Under Presnell, government
mistreatment of public employees was only violative if it interfered with future,
private employment opportunities. Prior to deciding Tully in 2018, the court
had never recognized a fundamental right to pursue work in the public sector
free from unreasonable government interference. 33
B.

Factual Summary and Procedural History

Kevin Tully—a police corporal for the Wilmington Police Department—
applied for a promotion after eleven distinguished years of service. 34 During his
tenure, Tully investigated over fifty homicides, led twelve homicide
investigations with a 100% clearance rate, and was named the 2011 “Wilmington
Police Officer of the Year.” 35
Tully completed a written examination as part of his application but
failed. 36 Confused, Tully obtained a copy of the official exam and discovered he
had outsmarted the test: the “correct” answers were based on outdated law. 37
Tully filed a grievance informing the city of its error but was told that “the test
answers were not a grievable item.” 38 This response directly conflicted with the
department’s policy manual, which stated that “[c]andidates may appeal any
portion of the selection process.” 39
Tully filed suit on December 30, 2014, alleging state constitutional
violations. 40 Tully’s claim alleged that the city’s denial of his promotion
29. 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
30. Id. at 717–18, 260 S.E.2d at 613.
31. Id. at 718–19, 260 S.E.2d at 613.
32. Id. at 719, 260 S.E.2d at 614.
33. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 533, 810 S.E.2d 208, 213 (2018) (“[A]pplication
of this constitutional provision in the present context is an issue of first impression.”).
34. Id. at 528, 810 S.E.2d at 210–211.
35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. at 528, 810 S.E.2d at 211.
37. Id. at 529, 810 S.E.2d at 211.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 530, 810 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting CITY OF WILMINGTON POLICE DEP’T, POLICY
MANUAL directive 4.11, ¶ III(f), at 6 (rev. ed. July 25, 2011)).
40. Id. at 530, 810 S.E.2d at 211–12. Tully pleaded violations of both article I, section 1 and article
I, section 19. Section 19 prohibits deprivation of life, liberty, or property “but by the law of the land,”
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“arbitrarily and irrationally deprived [him] of enjoyment of the fruits of his own
labor” in violation of article I, section 1. 41 The trial court dismissed Tully’s
claims. 42 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Tully
was entitled to a “‘non-arbitrary and non-capricious promotional process’ in
accordance with the rules set forth in the Policy Manual, including its appeals
provision.” 43
C.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s Analysis

The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed, finding that, as pleaded by
Tully, the state acted arbitrarily and capriciously by denying him the right to
appeal a portion of his promotion application when its policies allowed him to
“appeal any portion of the selection process” in violation of his constitutional
rights. 44 The test answers were in fact a “grievable item.” Consequently, Tully
had been denied his “right under Article I, Section 1 to pursue his chosen
profession free from actions by his governmental employer that, by their very
nature, are unreasonable because they contravene policies specifically
promulgated by that employer for the purpose of having a fair promotional
process.” 45
The Tully court rooted its holding in four doctrinal conclusions. First, the
court noted that the rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights must be
interpreted “liberal[ly] . . . in favor of [North Carolina] citizens.” 46 Reflecting
on the history of article I, section 1, 47 the court concluded that “[t]he very
purpose of the Declaration of Rights is to ensure that the violation of these
rights is never permitted by anyone who might be invested under the
Constitution with the powers of the State.” 48
Second, the court reaffirmed that the fruits clause constitutes a
“fundamental guarant[y]” 49 that “emphasizes the dignity, integrity and liberty

a phrase “synonymous with due process.” Id. at 538–39, 810 S.E.2d at 216–17 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (first quoting N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; and then quoting State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764,
769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949)).
41. Id. at 530, 810 S.E.2d at 212.
42. Id. at 531, 810 S.E.2d at 212.
43. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Tully v. City of Wilmington, 249 N.C. App. 204, 210, 790
S.E.2d 854, 858 (2016)).
44. Id. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215–16.
46. Id. at 533, 810 S.E.2d at 214 (quoting Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d
276, 290 (1992)).
47. See supra Section I.A.
48. Tully, 370 N.C. at 533, 810 S.E.2d at 213–14 (quoting Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761,
783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992)).
49. Id. at 534, 810 S.E.2d at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ballance,
229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949)).
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of the individual, the primary concern of our democracy.” 50 Drawing a line from
its antiregulatory precedent to the current case, the court repeated that the
clause is “very broad in scope” and is “intended to secure . . . extensive
individual rights.” 51
Third, the Tully court explicitly held that the fruits clause applies both
when the government acts as a regulator and when “a governmental entity acts
in an arbitrary and capricious manner toward one of its employees.” 52 Echoing
Presnell, the court held that, although Tully lacked a property interest in a
promotion, he had a “liberty interest in pursuing [his] chosen profession free
from unreasonable actions of [his] employer.” 53
Finally, the court held that a public employer’s action is “arbitrary and
capricious” when it “fail[s] to abide by promotional procedures that the
employer itself put in place.” 54 For this conclusion, the court looked to federal
caselaw from other contexts—immigration and tax law—which has held that
agency action in violation of “rules, regulations, or procedures which it has
established” will be struck down. 55
Relying on these four conclusions, the court found that Tully had properly
stated a claim for relief. 56 Noting “the admittedly sparse authority in this area
of the law,” the Tully court elected not to proffer a broad constitutional cause of
action but instead limited its holding to the facts of the immediate case. 57 In
order to state a claim “grounded in this unique right under the North Carolina
Constitution,” 58 the court held:
a public employee must show that no other state law remedy is available
and plead facts establishing three elements: (1) a clear, established rule
or policy existed regarding the employment promotional process that
furthered a legitimate governmental interest; (2) the employer violated
that policy; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result of that violation. 59

50. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 693, 114
S.E.2d 660, 663 (1960)).
51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51
S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949)).
52. Id. at 535, 810 S.E.2d at 215.
53. Id. at 534, 810 S.E.2d at 214.
54. Id. at 535–36, 810 S.E.2d at 215.
55. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811–12 (4th Cir. 1969) (citing United States ex rel.
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, (1954)); see also Farlow v. N.C. State Bd. of Chiropractic
Exam’rs, 76 N.C. App. 202, 208, 332 S.E.2d 696, 700 (1985) (observing that Accardi’s “rationale is
sound”).
56. Tully, 370 N.C. at 537–38, 810 S.E.2d at 216.
57. Id. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 216.
58. Id. at 536–37, 810 S.E.2d at 216.
59. Id.
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II. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BE TREATED REASONABLY AT WORK
While the holding in Tully only addresses situations where a public
employer violates its own published policy, the court’s reasoning is considerably
broader. Rather than articulate a specific right for public employees, the court
applied the broad right developed in its previous fruits clause cases to the public
employer-employee relationship. This part endeavors to outline the contours of
this fundamental right to articulate why courts ought to apply heightened
scrutiny to public employer actions.
A.

The Fruits Clause Establishes a “Fundamental Right,” and Infringement
Receives Heightened Scrutiny

Article I, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution guarantees a
“fundamental right to ‘earn a livelihood’” 60 and “pursue [one’s] chosen
profession.” 61 To understand this right, North Carolina courts look to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence as guidance. 62 Still, the
North Carolina Constitution is “more detailed and specific than the federal
Constitution in the protection of the rights of its citizens.” 63 A regulation may
receive more exacting scrutiny under the North Carolina Constitution than it
would under federal law. 64 Thus, a government action that abridges the right to
pursue one’s chosen occupation will be held invalid unless it meets a “single
standard”: it must have a “rational, real and substantial relation to a valid
governmental objective.” 65 While this test sounds like “rational basis” review,
North Carolina precedent strongly suggests that it bites like heightened

60. King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367 N.C. 400, 408, 758 S.E.2d 364, 371 (2014) (quoting Roller
v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 518–19, 96 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1957)).
61. Tully, 370 N.C. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215.
62. See, e.g., Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 724, 260 S.E.2d 611, 617 (1979) (first citing Codd v.
Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); and then citing Cox v. N. Va. Transp. Comm’n, 551 F.2d 555 (4th Cir.
1976)). Interestingly, the Presnell court cited to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and to Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), for the proposition that a fundamental right “to engage in any of the
common occupations of life” was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as well as by article I,
section 1. Presnell, 298 N.C. at 724, 260 S.E.2d at 617 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399). However, the
Presnell court seemingly ignored the Supreme Court’s decision to abandon its economic fundamental
rights jurisprudence in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). Still, the Tully court
referenced Presnell as a justification for the existence of a similar right under article I, section 1 of the
North Carolina Constitution. Tully, 370 N.C. at 534–35, 810 S.E.2d at 214–15. Thus, it is appropriate
to consider Presnell instructive in our effort to understand the implications of the fruits clause on public
employees, even if Presnell’s treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment is no longer doctrinally sound.
63. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992).
64. See Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 351–52, 350 S.E.2d 365, 369
(1986) (“[O]ur state Supreme Court has reserved the right to grant relief against unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious legislation under our state constitution in circumstances under which no relief
might be granted by federal court interpretations of due process.”).
65. Id. at 352, 350 S.E.2d at 369–70.
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scrutiny. A thorough analysis of this “single standard” is necessary to
understand how the fruits clause can be used to better protect public employees.
1. Ballance and the Development of the Single Heightened-Scrutiny Standard
The Supreme Court of North Carolina first articulated its modern “single
standard” test to measure violations of the fruits clause in State v. Ballance. 66
Decided in 1949, Ballance was adjudicated before the U.S. Supreme Court fully
developed modern scrutiny tests. 67 Still, the Ballance court had the benefit of
two U.S. Supreme Court cases outlining levels of scrutiny: United States v.
Carolene Products Co. 68 and Korematsu v. United States 69. Under Carolene
Products’s rational basis review, a law survives so long as it is rationally related
to some legitimate government objective, and courts give extreme deference to
the government, presuming “the existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment,” even in the absence of such facts. 70 In contrast, under the “rigid
scrutiny” 71 described in Korematsu, a court gives no deference to the government
and allows government action only after agreeing the action was “necessary” to
achieve a compelling government interest. 72
In Ballance, the state prohibited professional photographers from taking
pictures without a state license. 73 In support of the law, the government argued
that the licensing scheme reduced the risk of fire from photography chemicals
and protected the public from unskilled or fraudulent photographers. 74 Still, the
court struck down the licensing requirement as a violation of the fruits clause. 75
The Ballance court held that the law lacked a “rational, real, or substantial
relation to the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare”
and was not “reasonably necessary to promote the accomplishment of a public
good, or to prevent the infliction of a public harm.” 76 Despite the state’s
66. 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
67. Id.; cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (establishing the doctrine of strict scrutiny);
Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict
Scrutiny, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 29 (2005) (“It was in the Bolling case that the Court clearly
and definitively established its doctrine of ‘strict scrutiny.’”).
68. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
69. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). Korematsu
is widely regarded as a lousy example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s application of heightened scrutiny.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423; Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme
Court Moves from Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for African
Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 165, 167 (1996). Given that this case was the only example of
heightened scrutiny available to the Ballance court in 1949, though, it is worth outlining here.
70. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152.
71. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
72. Id. at 217–18.
73. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 766, 51 S.E.2d 731, 732 (1949).
74. Id. at 770–71, 51 S.E.2d at 735–36.
75. Id. at 772, 51 S.E.2d at 736.
76. Id. at 769–70, 51 S.E.2d at 735.
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contention that a regulation of photographers would reduce fire and fraud, the
court found that the fire risk posed by photographers’ chemicals was “no greater
than that inseparable from the things utilized daily in the home and in scores of
other vocations,” 77 and the risk of unskilled photography was “no more
dangerous to the public than any other ordinary occupation of life.” 78 Further,
the court reasoned that “ordinarily the public is best served by the free
competition of free men in a free market.” 79 Unskilled, fraudulent photography
could be better prevented, the court argued, through competition than
regulation. Finally, because the law attempted to regulate “one of the many
usual legitimate and innocuous vocations by which men earn their daily
bread,” 80 it violated the photographer’s fundamental right to “earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling.” 81
Ballance stands for three powerful principles that North Carolina courts
still use when applying heightened scrutiny to determine whether a government
action violates the fruits clause. First, the deference typical of Carolene Products’s
rational basis review is not afforded to the government under the “single
standard.” The Ballance court did not presume the existence of facts supporting
the legislature’s assertion that its regulation would reduce fire and fraud and
rejected those proffered interests. 82 Second, the government’s proffered “valid”
interest must be directly connected to the occupation regulated. Government
regulation of photography was inappropriate in Ballance, in part, because
photography was a “usual legitimate and innocuous vocation[].” 83 Third,
government action is not “reasonably related” when its proffered interest can
be achieved through less restrictive, alternative means. The Ballance court
rejected the regulation, in part, because fire and fraud could be more effectively
reduced in the open market without infringing on anyone’s constitutional
rights. These principles, applied here to regulation of a private occupation,
clearly constitute a more heightened scrutiny than traditional rational basis
review and can guide modern courts in evaluating government action toward
public employees.

77. Id. at 771, 51 S.E.2d at 735.
78. Id. at 771, 51 S.E.2d at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rawles v. Jenkins,
279 S.W. 350, 352 (Ky. 1925)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 770, 51 S.E.2d 735.
81. Id. at 769, 51 S.E.2d 734.
82. Id. at 771, 51 S.E.2d 735–36. Compare this reasoning in Ballance to the “great deference” given
to policymakers under the “rational basis test” implemented in Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160,
167, 180–81, 594 S.E.2d 1, 7, 15 (2004).
83. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 770–71, 51 S.E.2d at 735.
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2. Valid Government Interests and the Regulation of “Ordinary and Simple”
Occupations
Since Ballance, North Carolina courts have honed the meaning of “valid
governmental objective.” 84 To begin, a valid objective must “promote the
accomplishment of a public good” or “prevent the infliction of a public harm.” 85
Still, not every occupation is sufficiently connected to the public good to fall
within the scope of the so-called “police power.” 86 Thus, the government has no
valid reason to regulate those “ordinary lawful and innocuous occupations” at
the core of the fruits clause. 87
An occupation is “ordinary and simple” 88 so long as it does not have some
“distinguishing feature in the business itself or in the manner in which it is
ordinarily conducted, the . . . probable consequence of which, if unregulated, is
to produce substantial injury to the public peace, health, or welfare.” 89 In other
words, an occupation is beyond the reach of government regulation unless it can
be distinguished in a way that implicates the public welfare. Regulations of
these ordinary and simple occupations fail heightened scrutiny; because they
have insufficient connection to any public good, regulation of these occupations
lacks any legally sufficient “valid objective.” 90 Consequently, courts have “not
hesitated to strike down regulatory legislation” that touches on such occupations
“as repugnant to the State Constitution.” 91
The line between complex and simple occupations is a fine one. In North
Carolina Real Estate Licensing Board v. Aikens, 92 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals drew that line between real estate brokers and real estate advertisers.
Sixteen years earlier, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Warren 93
upheld a law regulating real estate brokers because real estate transactions
“provide opportunities for collusion to extract illicit gains” and are of serious

84. See Poor Richard’s, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 64, 366 S.E.2d 697, 698–99 (1988); Treants
Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 352, 350 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1986).
85. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 769–70, 51 S.E.2d at 735.
86. Id. at 769, 51 S.E.2d at 734 (“[T]he State possesses the police power in its capacity as a
sovereign, and in the exercise thereof, the Legislature may enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
protect or promote the health, morals, order, safety, and general welfare of society.”).
87. Id. at 770, 51 S.E.2d at 735.
88. N.C. Real Estate Licensing Bd. v. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. 8, 13, 228 S.E.2d 493, 496 (1976).
89. Stone, 322 N.C. at 65, 366 S.E.2d at 699 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State
v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 758–59, 6 S.E.2d 854, 863 (1940)).
90. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. at 11, 228 S.E.2d at 495.
91. Id. at 11, 228 S.E.2d at 495 (first citing Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957);
then citing Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731; then citing Palmer v. Smith, 229 N.C. 612, 51 S.E.2d
8 (1948); and then citing Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940)).
92. 31 N.C. App. 8, 228 S.E.2d 493 (1976).
93. 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660 (1960).
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“economic significance,” meaning the “mismanagement of either could produce
widespread distress and unrest.” 94
After Warren, the North Carolina General Assembly expanded the law to
cover those who advertise property available for sale, lease, or rent, without
actually facilitating any transactions. 95 The Aikens court distinguished these
advertisers from the brokers in Warren, since “[t]he business activity . . . does
not involve a confidential relationship with the customers nor negotiations or
other acts as an intermediary,” and none of the “knowledge of mortgages,
suretyships, escrow agreements and other real property subjects” required of
brokers was “reasonably relevant to [advertisers’] business activity.” 96 Unlike
real estate brokering, real estate advertising was an innocuous vocation
unrelated to a valid government interest. Because the government’s regulation
of this ordinary and simple occupation was not supported by a valid government
interest, the court invalidated the expanded regulation while allowing
regulation of real estate brokers to continue.
3. “Rational, Real and Substantial”: Is the Law Necessary and Tailored, and
Does the Benefit Outweigh the Burden?
The protection of the fruits clause is not limited only to ordinary and
simple occupations. As seen in Tully, North Carolina courts may invalidate
unreasonable government treatment of occupations at the heart of the police
power—police officers themselves. 97 Government action will survive
heightened scrutiny only if it has a “rational, real and substantial relation” to
the government’s objective. 98 Again, while this sounds like rational basis review,
it is not. To have a “rational, real, or substantial relation,” the policy must be
“reasonably necessary” to achieve that objective. 99 Similar to traditional
heightened scrutiny, a law can fail as “unnecessary” if the objective could be
achieved without infringing on the fundamental right, 100 the policy is
overinclusive, 101 the burden on an individual’s right outweighs the value of the

94. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. at 11–12, 228 S.E.2d at 496 (citing State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 114
S.E.2d 660 (1960)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 12, 228 S.E.2d at 496.
97. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 539, 810 S.E.2d 208, 217 (2018).
98. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 352, 350 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1986);
see also State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1949) (explaining the “rational, real,
or substantial relation” standard for the legitimacy of a state’s statute).
99. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 769–70; 51 S.E.2d at 735.
100. See, e.g., id. at 771, 51 S.E.2d at 736 (striking down a regulation where reliance on an
unregulated free market could more effectively ensure competency and integrity among
photographers).
101. See, e.g., Treants, 83 N.C. App. at 355, 350 S.E.2d at 372 (striking down a regulation of
prostitution because it broadly reached other, legitimate companion services).
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government’s interest, 102 or legal doctrine from “other contexts” suggests the
government policy or action is unreasonable. 103 These principles are best
understood with reference to precedent.
First, a law will fail heightened scrutiny if less burdensome alternatives
could achieve the government’s objective. The Ballance court struck down the
photography licensing scheme, in part, because the government’s goals could
have been achieved through the “free competition of free men in a free market”
without infringing on any individual liberties. 104 Again, the Ballance court gave
no deference to the government’s preference of method. 105
Second, a law will fail if it is overinclusive. In Treants Enterprises, Inc. v.
Onslow County, 106 a state law required licensing for any business “providing or
selling male or female companionship.” 107 While the North Carolina Court of
Appeals agreed that “[t]he prevention or hindrance of organized prostitution
. . . is unquestionably a valid objective of local government,” it struck down the
law as unnecessarily broad. 108 The court reasoned that the licensing requirement
placed an “onerous burden[]” on legitimate businesses uninvolved with
prostitution. 109 Thus, the court held that “[t]he denial or burdening of innocent
persons’ rights to practice lawful occupations because some other businesses . . .
are a subterfuge for illegal activity is capricious and irrational.” 110
Third, a law will fail if its burdens outweigh its benefits. In Poor Richard’s,
Inc. v. Stone, 111 the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a regulation on
military merchants’ property, but only after “balancing the public good likely
to result from their utilization against the burdens resulting to the businesses
being regulated.” 112 A policy’s reasonableness, the court decided, “becomes a
question of degree.” 113 There, the court decided that (1) the statute was
sufficiently narrow, since it sought only to regulate “those transactions which
involve military property” rather than all sales transactions; and (2) the
government’s objective of ensuring military property is not unlawfully sold
outweighed the real but limited burdens on the seller because the statute

102. Poor Richard’s, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 64, 366 S.E.2d 697, 698–99 (1988).
103. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215 (2018).
104. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 771, 51 S.E.2d at 736.
105. Id.
106. 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986).
107. Id. at 346, 350 S.E.2d at 366 (capitalization omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. at 355, 350 S.E.2d at 371–72.
109. Id. at 355, 350 S.E.2d at 372.
110. Id.
111. 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).
112. Id. at 66, 366 S.E.2d at 700 (citing In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282
N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973)).
113. Id.
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employed a “commonly used licensing scheme” that ordinary sellers could
navigate without much trouble. 114
This list is not exclusive. North Carolina courts may look to other areas of
state and federal law to determine whether a particular government action or
policy is unreasonable. 115 In Tully, the court cited federal immigration and tax
law to conclude that an agency’s government action that violates the agency’s
own policies is unreasonable. 116 The central question is whether, in light of all
circumstances—including the presence of less restrictive alternatives, the
breadth of the action, the burden on the individual, and other relevant legal
doctrines—the government’s action was reasonably necessary to further a valid
interest.
B.

The Fruits Clause Bars Public Employer Action That Is Not “Reasonably
Necessary” To Achieve a “Valid Governmental Interest”

As discussed above, the government cannot infringe on the right to pursue
one’s chosen occupation in the private sector unless the infringement has a
“rational, real and substantial relation to a valid government interest.” 117 In Tully
and Presnell, the Supreme Court of North Carolina extended that fundamental
guarantee to those whose “chosen occupation” is in the public sector as well. 118
Thus, while Tully adopted a narrow, fact-specific test, it is clear that the fruits
clause’s heightened scrutiny “single standard” test described above still restrains
the government when it acts as an employer as well as when it acts as a regulator.
To demonstrate a fruits clause violation under this “single standard,” a
public employee must first show (1) her right to pursue her chosen occupation
was injured by her employer; and (2) she has no other avenue for relief. 119 Then,
the burden shifts to the employer to (3) identify a “valid governmental
objective” achieved by the action; and (4) show that the action is “reasonably
necessary” to achieve that objective. 120 If the government’s action is found either
to be invalid or unnecessary, the court should find for the employee. This fourpart test, rooted in the fruits clause precedent outlined above, ensures that
government employers are acting within the confines of the state constitution.
114. Id.
115. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215 (2018).
116. Id. (first citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); and
then citing United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811–12 (4th Cir. 1969)).
117. See supra Section II.A.
118. See Tully, 370 N.C. at 539, 810 S.E.2d at 217; Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 723, 260 S.E.2d
611, 616 (1979).
119. Elements one and two are generally required for any direct claim under the North Carolina
Constitution. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992) (establishing
that direct claims can be brought “in the absence of an adequate state remedy” against a government
actor for violations of rights guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution).
120. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 352, 350 S.E.2d 365, 369–70
(1986).
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1. Injury to a Public Employee’s Right To “Earn A Livelihood”
Under step one, a public employee must show that his or her right to
pursue his or her chosen occupation was injured by a government policy or
action. 121 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has made clear that the fruits
clause creates a liberty right to work, not a property interest in any particular
job—ironically, the right to “enjoy the fruits of their own labor” is a
fundamental right to pursue those fruits but does not create a property right to
the fruits themselves. 122 Instead, to state a claim under the fruits clause, an
employee must point to a violation of her liberty right to pursue her chosen
occupation without unreasonable government interference.
No case has neatly defined a full list of possible fruits clause violations. In
Tully, the plaintiff did not have a property right to a promotion but did have a
liberty right to pursue a promotion within the confines of his employer’s stated
grievance policy. 123 In Presnell, the employee lacked a property right to her job
but maintained a liberty right to pursue similar work elsewhere without the
burden of defamatory accusations from her previous governmental employer. 124
Additionally, Ballance and its progeny hold that burdensome regulation of an
occupation may constitute infringement of an individual’s right to pursue that
occupation. 125
2. Alternative Avenues for Relief
Under step two, public employees must show that they have no adequate,
alternative state law remedy. Direct claims under the North Carolina
Constitution are available only “in the absence of an adequate state remedy.” 126
This is a “logical limitation” 127: direct constitutional remedies are “furnished”
by courts under state common law, “which provides a remedy for every
wrong.” 128 If an “adequate” remedy is available under a state statute, courts will
not furnish a constitutional remedy.

121. See Peele v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 447, 451, 368 S.E.2d 892, 894–95
(1988) (finding a public employee had not stated a claim for relief because her rights under article I,
section 1 had not been violated).
122. Tully, 370 N.C. at 538, 810 S.E.2d at 217 (“[A] property interest in employment ‘can arise
from or be created by statute, ordinance, or express or implied contract, the scope of which must be
determined with reference to state law.’” (quoting Presnell, 298 N.C. at 723, 260 S.E.2d at 616)).
123. Id. (“We are aware of no authority recognizing a property interest in a promotion . . . .”).
124. Presnell, 298 N.C. at 723, 260 S.E.2d at 616 (“These allegations are insufficient to show a
Fourteenth Amendment ‘property’ right or vested interest in plaintiff’s continued employment.”)
125. See State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 770, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1949).
126. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992).
127. Matthew R. Gauthier, Kicking and Screaming: Dragging North Carolina’s Direct Constitutional
Claims into the Twenty-First Century, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1744 (2017).
128. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
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North Carolina courts have not fully defined what state law remedies are
adequate. 129 Generally speaking, a remedy will be adequate so long as it allows
the plaintiff to “enter the courthouse doors and present his claim”—in other
words, the opportunity for victory must be guaranteed to the plaintiff, not
victory itself. 130 Still, a remedy is generally inadequate if it is barred by
sovereign immunity. 131
Some fruits clause cases may fail step two. For example, a public employee
who is terminated in violation of her written employment contract, such as a
tenured public university professor, likely has an adequate remedy under state
contract law and thus could not bring a claim under the fruits clause. State law
also bars employment discrimination based on “race, religion, color, national
origin, age, sex or handicap” by employers of fifteen or more employees. 132 Most
public employees, though, have no written or implied contract with their
employers and many have claims that do not arise under any state or common
law principle. These employees may be able to satisfy step two and show they
have no “adequate remedy.”
3. Valid Government Objectives in Regulating Its Own Employees
At step three, the government bears the burden to show that its action was
in pursuit of a “valid governmental objective.” 133 In many cases, this burden will
be easily met. Since government jobs are by definition connected to the public
health, safety, morals, or welfare, even the most ordinary and simple
government job can be “distinguish[ed]” from those professions protected in
Ballance and its progeny by the simple fact that each is a public, not private,
occupation. 134
Still, the government’s power to regulate its employees does not guarantee
that every action will be in service of a valid governmental objective. A
government action may fail if, like in Tully, the government presents no “reason
or rationale” whatsoever for its infringement. 135 In addition, a government
objective may be invalidated by another limit on the police power—racial
animus, for example, is not a valid government objective. 136 Unlike rational basis
129. For a full analysis of the contours of direct claims under the North Carolina Constitution, see
Gauthier, supra note 127, at 1736–38.
130. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 333–34, 340, 678 S.E.2d 351, 355 (2009).
131. Corum, 330 N.C. at 785–86, 413 S.E.2d at 291–92.
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (2019).
133. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 352, 350 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1986);
see Poor Richard’s, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 64–65, 366 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1988).
134. See Stone, 322 N.C. at 65, 366 S.E.2d at 699.
135. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215 (2018).
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (barring racial discrimination of employees generally); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (invalidating a ban on interracial marriage because “[t]here is patently
no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies” such a
ban); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I cannot conceive of
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review, where courts presume “the existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment,” 137 the government must prove under heightened scrutiny that its
actions were actually taken in pursuit of a legally valid objective.
4. “Reasonably Necessary” Employer Policies and Actions
Under step four, the government bears the burden to show that its action
is “reasonably necessary” to accomplish its valid objective. While a court may
look to a wide range of factors in determining whether a particular government
action was reasonably necessary, seven factors from the fruits clause precedent
analyzed above appear particularly relevant to the public employer-employee
context.
To determine whether a government employer’s action or policy was
“reasonably necessary,” a court should consider: (1) the degree to which the job
is “ordinary and simple;” (2) the degree to which the regulation is tailored to
the interest; (3) the significance of the government’s interest; (4) the
significance of the burden on the employee; (5) the degree to which the policy
is consistent with other government policies; (6) the degree to which the policy
is reasonable in light of similar policies in other contexts; and (7) how judicial
intervention would impact constitutional structure and the separation of
powers.
Factor one reflects precedential significance of job complexity. Jobs that
include great responsibility for public finances, health, or welfare or are
vulnerable to illicit behavior warrant more stringent regulation, while more
ordinary and simple jobs warrant less burdensome restrictions. Details of the
job are particularly important—recall the difference in Aikens between real
estate brokers and real estate advertisers. 138 For example, while passage of a
thorough background check may be a reasonably necessary prerequisite to
ensure a public school custodian does not pose a threat to school children, such
a restriction may be less reasonably necessary for a custodian in a public building
that has no children.
Factor two reflects precedential hostility to regulations that are overbroad
and interests that can be achieved through less restrictive means. As in Ballance,
each court must determine the actual causal relationship between the action and
the intended result and inquire whether other, less restrictive actions could
achieve the same result. 139 And, as in Aikens, an action reasonably necessary to
regulate one occupation—like real estate brokers—may still violate the fruits
a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a person’s skin the test . . . .”); Enoch v. Inman,
164 N.C. App. 415, 415–16, 596 S.E.2d 361, 362 (2004) (holding state employees may sue for race
discrimination under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
137. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
138. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text.
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clause if it reaches another occupation—like real estate advertisers—for which
the action is unnecessary. 140
Factors three and four reflect the Stone balancing test and hostility toward
regulations whose burdens outweigh its benefits. 141 Like in Stone, each court
ought to factor individual “burdens” against the “public good likely to result”
from the government action. 142 Narrowly tailored, “commonly used” burdens
on employees may be justified by significant government benefits. 143 Again, the
court should assess a regulation’s tailoring, benefits, and burdens on the merits
rather than defer to the government’s assessment. 144
Factors five and six reflect Tully’s reasoning: allowing courts to look to
outside reference points to assess reasonableness. 145 As held in Tully, a public
employer’s action that violates its own policies is presumptively
unreasonable. 146 Under factor five, a burdensome policy or action is less
reasonable if other North Carolina agencies or political subdivisions achieve the
same objectives through less burdensome policies. Factor six allows courts to
look to employment policies in other jurisdictions and the private sector and to
legal doctrines in other areas of law to measure whether an employer’s action is
reasonably necessary. For example, a county’s use of employee surveillance
technology 147 designed to reduce employee theft may be less reasonable if other
North Carolina counties, or similar counties across the United States, or even
substantially similar private employers, maintain lower theft rates without
utilizing invasive technology. Certainly, each job, county, department, and state
has its own idiosyncrasies, and public employers should have the flexibility to
pursue new solutions to local problems. Factors five and six simply allow courts
to inform their reasonableness determinations by looking to outside
standards. 148
140. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text.
142. Poor Richards, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 66, 366 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1988).
143. Id.
144. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
145. See Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215 (2018) (looking to
federal immigration and tax administrative law to determine whether an agency action is unreasonable
when it violates its own policies); supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
146. Tully, 370 N.C. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215; see supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
147. Employee surveillance technology is becoming more popular, particularly among private
technology companies. See Ellen Sheng, Employee Privacy in the US Is at Stake as Corporate Surveillance
Technology Monitors Workers’ Every Move, CNBC (July 22, 2019, 6:42 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/15/employee-privacy-is-at-stake-as-surveillance-tech-monitorsworkers.html [https://perma.cc/GTH7-P29B].
148. Outside “standards of care” are widely used to show unreasonableness in North Carolina
employment law. White v. Consol. Planning, Inc., 166 N.C. App. 283, 302, 603 S.E.2d 147, 160 (2004)
(“Plaintiff offered sufficient expert testimony regarding the standard of care in the insurance industry
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [defendant] breached its duty to plaintiff.”).
Outside “standards of care” are also common to show unreasonableness in other areas of North Carolina
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Finally, I add one concern that has not been mentioned in any fruits clause
case prior but should be considered in future cases concerning public employees.
Like the federal Constitution, the North Carolina Constitution vests each
branch of government with “separate and distinct powers. 149 Factor seven asks
courts to recognize that any claim asking for judicial relief for an employee of
the executive or legislative branches necessarily calls into question this
separation of powers. Public political jobs intimately involved in the
effectuation of powers enumerated to other branches, such as a governor’s chief
of staff or a legislator’s political advisor, may warrant different regulation than
nonpolitical jobs. Still, North Carolina courts have not shied away from
prohibiting or compelling action from other branches when fundamental rights
are concerned. 150 Courts are obliged to protect even political employees from
unreasonable government treatment.
III. EXAMPLES: CREATIVE USE OF THE FRUITS CLAUSE
Two concrete examples—overworked school counselors and social
workers, and legislative staffers facing sexual harassment—help to explain how
the promise of the fruits clause can be leveraged to improve the lives of North
Carolina’s public employees.
A.

Overworked School Counselors and Social Workers

In addition to teachers, administrators, and other support staff, North
Carolina’s public schools employ school counselors and social workers to
“promote student success, provide preventive services, and respond to

law, such as products liability and medical negligence. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp.,
124 N.C. App. 59, 64–65, 476 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1996) (“The essential elements of a products liability
action predicated upon negligence are: ‘(1) evidence of a standard of care owed by the reasonably
prudent person in similar circumstances; (2) breach of that standard of care; (3) injury caused directly
or proximately by the breach, and; (4) loss because of the injury.’” (quoting Ziglar v. E. I. Du Pont de
Neumers & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 150, 280 S.E.2d 510, 513 (1981))), aff’d as modified, 346 N.C. 767,
488 S.E.2d 240 (1997); see also Robinson v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., Inc., 229 N.C. App. 215, 233, 747
S.E.2d 321, 334 (2013) (“In order to maintain an action for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must offer
evidence to establish (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) breach of that standard; (3) proximate
causation; and (4) damages.”).
149. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State
government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The executive
power of the State shall be vested in the Governor.”); id. art. IV, § 1 (“The judicial power of the State
shall . . . be vested in a Court for the Trial of Impeachments and in a General Court of Justice.”).
150. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 357, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (1997) (holding that the
North Carolina legislature cannot deny students the right to “equal access” to public education without
showing the denial was “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Town of Beech Mountain v. County of Watauga, 324 N.C. 409, 412, 378
S.E.2d 780, 782 (1989))).
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identified student needs.” 151 School counselors monitor and treat their students’
mental health through school-wide programming and one-on-one counseling. 152
School social workers “provide the vital link between the home, school, and
community” 153 by “connecting students and their families to critical community
services such as food stamps, healthcare services and childcare alternatives.” 154
School shootings, natural disasters, and rising teen suicide rates have
placed outsized pressure on counselors and social workers, who often serve as
the only mental health professionals in their students’ lives. 155 The vast majority
of today’s students—72%—experience some significant stressor, such as
violence, abuse, or the loss of a loved one, before the age of eighteen. 156 Suicides
among children ages ten to seventeen increased by 70% in the decade between
2006 and 2016. 157 To effectively serve every student’s needs, the American
School Counselor Association (“ASCA”) and the National Association of Social
Workers (“NASW”) recommend employing one counselor and one social
worker for every 250 students. 158 A lower ratio of one counselor and social
worker per fifty students is recommended when the social worker or counselor
is providing services to students with intensive needs, like suicidal tendencies,
addiction, or trauma. 159
American schools lag behind the ASCA- and NASW-recommended
ratios. Nationally, public schools employ on average one counselor for every
151. REBECCA GARLAND, SCHOOL COUNSELOR JOB DESCRIPTION 6 (2008),
https://files.nc.gov/dpi/documents/studentsupport/counseling/standards/counselordesc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RY36-HJES].
152. Id. at 6–7.
153. School Social Worker, N.C. DEP’T PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://www.dpi.nc.gov/
educators/specialized-instructional-support/school-social-worker [https://perma.cc/ZP29-YBNE].
154. What Is the Difference Between a School Counselor and a Social Worker?, ABA DEGREE
PROGRAM GUIDE, https://www.abadegreeprograms.net/faq/what-is-the-difference-between-a-schoolcounselor-and-a-social-worker/ [https://perma.cc/UF9B-SNG4].
155. Bethany Bray, One School Counselor per 455 Students: Nationwide Average Improves,
COUNSELING TODAY (May 10, 2019), https://ct.counseling.org/2019/05/one-school-counselor-per455-students-nationwide-average-improves/ [https://perma.cc/34KL-RWB3]; Mattie Quinn, After
Shootings and Hurricanes, Where Are the School Counselors?, GOVERNING: FUTURE STS. & LOCALITIES
(Apr. 9, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/education/gov-school-counselors-traumashooting-disaster.html [https://perma.cc/A9JE-HQKD].
156. AMIR WHITAKER ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COPS AND NO COUNSELORS:
HOW THE LACK OF SCHOOL MENTAL HEALTH STAFF IS HARMING STUDENTS 4,
https://www.aclu.org/report/cops-and-no-counselors [https://perma.cc/GX24-PP5Q].
157. Id.
158. NASW Highlights the Growing Need for School Social Workers To Prevent School Violence, NAT’L
ASS’N SOC. WORKERS (Mar. 27, 2018) [hereinafter NASW News Release],
https://www.socialworkers.org/News/News-Releases/ID/1633/NASW-Highlights-the-GrowingNeed-for-School-Social-Workers-to-Prevent-School-Violence
[https://perma.cc/PE3L-XTD2];
Student-to-School-Counselor
Ratio
2015–2016,
AM.
SCH.
COUNS.
ASS’N,
https://www.schoolcounselor.org/asca/media/asca/home/Ratios15-16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JRU4FMGY].
159. NASW News Release, supra note 158.
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455 students—nearly double the recommended ratio. 160 Social workers fare even
worse. As of 2016, American schools averaged one social worker for every 2000
students, and “[m]ore than 67,000 schools reported zero social workers serving
their students.” 161 These higher ratios result in negative outcomes for both
children and support staff: due to the highly emotionally taxing nature of their
work, “overworked and under-resourced” 162 counselors and social workers are
particularly vulnerable to burnout. 163
North Carolina similarly lags behind the recommended ratios. Symone
Kiddoo, a Durham County social worker, reported being solely responsible for
1125 students—a ratio nearly five times the NASW recommendation. 164 She is
not alone. On average, the state employs one counselor for every 367 students
and one social worker for every 2000. 165 These high ratios are just the average.
Though data for each school counselor and social worker’s workload is not
publicly available, it is not hard to imagine a counselor or social worker whose
ratio is significantly higher than the average, with 3000 to 4000 students under
their individual care (as opposed to the recommended 500).
By using the test outlined above, a court could find these individual,
extreme ratios between school counselors or social workers and their students
to be a violation of the fruits clause. To demonstrate the four-part test outlined
above, let’s imagine a hypothetical plaintiff who works as a school counselor and
is individually responsible for 500 students.
1. Step One: Interference
At step one, an employee must show that an outsized number of students
interferes with her right to pursue her chosen occupation. Our plaintiff has
chosen to work as a counselor in a public school. Her large student load infringes
on her ability to pursue her career in two ways: first, high counselor-to-student
ratios pose an emotional roadblock to counselors. In addition to the ordinary
160. T. Keung Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough? Berger and NCAE Hotly Debate Issue
Ahead of May 1 March, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Apr. 29, 2019, 4:17 PM) [hereinafter Hui, How
Many School Counselors Is Enough?], https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/
article229802244.html [https://perma.cc/6V62-853D (dark archive)].
161. WHITAKER ET AL., supra note 156, at 12.
162. Alanna Fuschillo, The Troubling Student-to-Counselor Ratio that Doesn’t Add Up, EDUC. WK.
(Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/08/14/the-troubling-student-to-counselorratio-that-doesnt-add.html?cmp=eml-enl-eu-news1&M=58578827&U=1001093
[https://perma.cc/GY2R-SUFV].
163. Rhonda Williams, The Importance of Self-Care, ASCA: SCHOOLCOUNSELOR (Jan. 1, 2011),
https://www.schoolcounselor.org/magazine/blogs/january-february-2011/the-importance-of-self-care
[https://perma.cc/RT6D-FE2X] (“Researchers have identified that the range of school counselors who
have high levels of emotional exhaustion and burnout is between 30 percent and 66 percent.”).
164. Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160.
165. Greg Childress, On School Psychologists, North Carolina Doesn’t Measure Up, PROGRESSIVE
PULSE (Jan. 18, 2019), http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2019/01/18/north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/
62DR-NFNK].

98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1575 (2020)

1596

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

fatigue of being overworked, counseling is a uniquely draining profession that
leaves professionals emotionally exhausted. 166 A counselor with double the
number of recommended students may be unable to persist in her chosen
profession, getting burned out early in her career. 167
Second, high counselor-student ratios reduce a counselor’s ability to do
her job effectively. Counselors are simultaneously responsible for improving
their school’s mental health environment and providing direct therapy to highneed students. 168 A counselor responsible for 500 students likely has twice as
many high-need students but the same amount of time, causing her to spend
less time with each student or fail to meet with a student entirely. Further,
counselors are often additionally responsible for scheduling, testing, and other
administrative work, which also increases with their student load. 169
Consequently, counselors with high ratios may have less total time to spend with
a greater number of high need students. This restriction on efficacy could be
viewed by a court as a burdensome regulation of her chosen profession since the
government’s decision to burden her with extra students has hindered her
ability to pursue the fruits of her labor: improved children’s mental health.
The state in our hypothetical case could contend that, since mental health
professionals exist in the private sector, this burden does not interfere with our
plaintiff’s ability to pursue her chosen occupation outside the school system.
More on point, private schools also employ counselors to conduct highly similar
work. Still, public school counselors have different responsibilities than private
sector counselors, 170 often working county or statewide to improve mental
health outcomes. 171 Public school counselors have greater access to a wide range
of students, since minority students in particular “are more likely to follow
through with school-based services due to the barriers to accessing community
mental health services.” 172 Further, the mental and emotional strain placed on
counselors working with an outsized number of students could cause burnout,
making them unwilling or unable to continue working as a counselor, even in

166. Williams, supra note 163 (“[C]ounseling is a form of one-way giving.”).
167. See id.
168. GARLAND, supra note 151, at 7.
169. See Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160.
170. For example, public school counselors often help students with career or college plans.
Typically, private school counselors do not. School Counselor 101, EDUCATOR’S ALLY (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://educatorsally.com/school-counselor-101/ [https://perma.cc/BG4Y-RJUM].
171. See N.C. SCH. COUNSELOR ASS’N, STRATEGIC PLAN: 2013-2014 THROUGH 2018-2019, at
4–5, https://www.ncschoolcounselor.org/page-1535570 [https://perma.cc/6JT8-6LVR] (describing the
professional development objectives for school counselors and the desired results including an
“[i]ncrease in requests for NCSCA representation in statewide activities and events.”).
172. Carol J. Kaffenberger & Judith O’Rorke-Trigani, Addressing Student Mental Health Needs by
Providing Direct and Indirect Services and Building Alliances in the Community, 16 PROF. SCH.
COUNSELING 323, 325 (2013).
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the private sector. 173 Like in Presnell, this reduction in a school counselor’s
ability to find work in the private sector could constitute an interference with
her state constitutional rights. 174
2. Step Two: Adequate Alternatives
In step two, the employee must show that she has no adequate alternatives
to remedy her grievance. For our hypothetical plaintiff, this is likely easy to
prove. School counselors are typically at-will employees and, if they have multiyear employment contracts, which are rare, the contract likely does not
guarantee any counselor-student ratio. 175 Further, North Carolina public
employees are barred from collective bargaining, a typical method used to
address burdensome work conditions in other states. 176
The state could argue that, because school funding and hiring is a political
determination, school counselors should turn to the political process to push
school districts to reduce counselor-student ratios. This argument would likely
fall flat, though. In many of the fruits clause cases outlined above, plaintiffs
could have petitioned the legislature to repeal the unconstitutional regulation. 177
Never has a North Carolina court recognized political lobbying as an adequate
alternative in fruits clause cases.
3. Step Three: Valid Governmental Objective
At step three, the government bears the burden of showing that its action
was in furtherance of a valid governmental objective. Here, the government’s
primary objective is budgetary. The legislature and school districts must balance
the cost of hiring more counselors with other budgetary priorities, such as hiring
more teachers and increasing employee pay while keeping taxes competitive
with other nearby states. 178 Certainly, the state’s budget priorities are valid
173. See Williams, supra note 163.
174. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
175. School districts are allowed to sign school employees to multi-year contracts, but few do. See
T. Keung Hui, It’s Not Tenure, but NC Teachers Will Get More Job Security, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh
Dec. 20, 2017, 1:03 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/education/article190767074.html
[https://perma.cc/WYQ2-JSE9 (dark archive)].
176. Dawn Baumgartner Vaughn, Freshmen State Legislators Want To Overturn Law that Has Held
Back Unions for 60 Years, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Apr. 24, 2019, 7:20 PM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article229597039.html
[https://perma.cc/2YPR-2FBG
(dark archive)].
177. See, e.g., State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 768–72, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734–36 (1949) (striking down
a commercially restrictive statute on constitutional grounds alone and never mentioning a requirement
that a plaintiff petition the legislature first before commencing litigation).
178. The North Carolina General Assembly’s 2019 budget proposal included some raises for state
employees and teachers, hired more school psychologists, increased the state’s “rainy day fund,” and
preserved a corporate tax cut but fell short of providing the $688 million necessary to meet nationally
recommended ratios for school counselors, social workers, nurses, psychologists, and resource officers
statewide. See Dan Way, N.C. General Assembly Releases Budget Plan; Prepares for Battle with Governor,
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governmental interests. Still, because providing each student with a “sound
basic education” is also a constitutionally prescribed, valid governmental
objective, 179 the state may struggle to show that its decision to burden our
hypothetical plaintiff with 500 students was reasonably necessary to achieve its
budgetary priorities.
4. Step Four: Reasonably Necessary
At step four, the government must show that its interference with
plaintiff’s constitutional right was reasonably necessary to achieve the interests
established in step three. As discussed above, a court should look to seven
factors to determine whether the state’s interference was reasonably necessary.
Factor one (job complexity) weighs in favor of both our plaintiff and the
state. School counseling is a complex job—North Carolina school counselors are
required to have a master’s degree and have a direct impact on the mental health
of North Carolina children. 180 Typically, the judiciary should defer to the state’s
experienced judgment on how to regulate these complicated professions. In this
case, though, the state likely cannot claim that an extreme 1:500 counselorstudent ratio is a beneficial regulation on the school counseling profession. High
ratios have demonstrably negative impacts on student mental health outcomes,
college admissions, and overall student success. 181 Thus, job complexity in this
case may suggest counselors need more one-on-one time with students and, thus,
lower ratios.
Factor two (tailoring) weighs strongly in favor of the plaintiff. While
increased funding would help reduce counselor ratios across the state, the
General Assembly could eliminate extreme counselor-student ratios without
providing increased funding. In July 2017, the legislature required all school
districts to reduce average class sizes for kindergarten through third-grade
classes from twenty-two to seventeen students without providing additional
funding. 182 While the plan was politically unpopular and eventually
CAROLINA J. (June 25, 2019, 4:24 PM), https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/n-c-generalassembly-releases-budget-plan-prepares-for-battle-with-governor/ [https://perma.cc/9PN4-YS6T];
Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160.
179. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 345, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (1997); see N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 7.
180. North Carolina school counselors are required to have a master’s degree. School Counseling,
N.C. DEP’T PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://www.dpi.nc.gov/educators/specialized-instructionalsupport/school-counseling [https://perma.cc/L8R2-EQA5].
181. James Murphy, The Undervaluing of School Counselors, ATLANTIC (Sep. 16, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/09/the-neglected-link-in-the-high-school-tocollege-pipeline/500213/ [https://perma.cc/TQ6B-ASGU (dark archive)].
182. See, e.g., T. Keung Hui & Lynn Bonner, North Carolina Schools Get Reprieve on K-3 Class-Size
Rules, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Feb. 8, 2019, 2:08 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/
news/local/education/article199108964.html [https://perma.cc/MN6G-J35U (dark archive)] (detailing
the delay of a class-size reduction law that was imposed without additional funding).
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abandoned, 183 the legislature could conceivably employ a similar strategy to
require school districts to rein in extreme counselor-student ratios without
sacrificing their valid budgetary objectives. The presence of a budget-neutral
alternative to extreme ratios, even a politically unpopular one, undermines the
state’s argument that high ratios are reasonably necessary to achieve it budget
priorities.
Factors three (government interest) and four (employee burden) likely
weigh in favor of the plaintiff as well. While the government does have an
interest in reducing spending, that interest is likely small compared to the
significant burden a 1:500 counselor-student ratio places on the employee.
Reducing ratios for school counselors, social workers, nurses, psychologists, and
resource officers statewide to recommended levels would cost $688 million; 184
however, it would cost significantly less to eliminate extreme examples where a
counselor has a number of students that far exceeds the statewide average. This
reduced cost would likely pose a small burden on the state: in 2018, North
Carolina had a $357 million surplus and spent over $100 million of the $23
billion budget on earmarks, or “no-strings-attached cash to faith-based and
other charities” and local governments. 185 In contrast, our hypothetical plaintiff
is effectively working two jobs, responsible for twice as many students, crises,
programs, meetings, forms and filings as is recommended for her profession. In
the absence of additional facts, the burden on our plaintiff far outweighs the
financial burden on the state to remedy her extreme workload.
Factors five (state comparisons) and six (national comparisons) weigh in
favor of both parties. On one hand, at 500 students, our plaintiff treats 133
students more than North Carolina’s average counselor at 1:367. Since average
counselor-student ratios fluctuate county by county, 186 the plaintiff can likely
point to counties in North Carolina where no counselors are responsible for 500
students. National comparisons also favor the plaintiff: the plaintiff’s load is
higher than the national recommended ratio and actual average. 187 On the other
hand, only two states have managed to reach the recommended counselorstudent ratio, and North Carolina’s average ratio is lower than most states’

183. Id.
184. Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160.
185. Colin Campbell, Sooooie! There’s Plenty of Pork in the State Budget, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh June 1, 2018, 6:04 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article212376184.html
[https://perma.cc/9YJV-HTYM (dark archive)].
186. Wake County, home of North Carolina’s state capital, Raleigh, has an average 1:447
counselor-student ratio. Michael Perchick, Wake County Public Schools Budget Calls for More School
Support Staff, ABC11 (Apr. 11, 2018), https://abc11.com/3329095/ [https://perma.cc/M38V-VKHB].
Mecklenburg has a ratio of 1:358. See Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/districtsearch/district_detail.asp?ID2=3702970
[https://perma.cc/MZH3DRKH].
187. Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160.
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averages or the nation’s as a whole. 188 The government could argue that
reducing the student-to-counselor ratio further is unrealistic given these
comparisons. Still, the issue here is not the experience of the average school
counselor but a single school counselor who is responsible for twice the
recommended ratio. Because this counselor’s workload is significantly higher
than the state or federal averages, comparisons to other school systems could
benefit the plaintiff.
Finally, factor seven (separation of powers) favors the state. Hiring
additional counselors implicates the budgeting power at either the state or local
level, a power explicitly reserved to the legislative and executive branches. 189
Traditionally, courts are reluctant to instruct political bodies on how to allocate
funds. Still, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has required greater
education funding to guarantee fundamental rights in the past, and a recent
judicial order will require the state to significantly increase school funding in
future budgets. 190 While a court should hesitate before interfering with the
state’s budgetary power, doing so is appropriate where, as here, budget decisions
have interfered with a public employee’s constitutional rights. Because the
factors weigh in favor of our plaintiff when balanced, a court in this hypothetical
case should find that the government’s interference with the plaintiff’s right to
pursue her chosen occupation as a public school counselor was not reasonably
necessary to pursue valid budgetary interests, and thus violated the state
constitution.
B.

Sexual Harassment Reporting for Legislative Staff

A similar analysis can be conducted for the General Assembly’s sexual
harassment reporting policy for legislative staff. Under North Carolina Human
Resources policy, “[a]ll [North Carolina public] employees have the right to
work in an environment free from discrimination and harassing conduct.” 191
Generally, state employees who suffer harassment may bypass their immediate
supervisor and file a report through an independent process 192—any employee,
that is, except staffers at the General Assembly. Currently, legislative staff,

188. Student-to-School-Counselor Ratio 2015–2016, supra note 158.
189. See N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3).
190. See Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 356–357, 488 S.E.2d 249, 260 (1997); Herbert L. White,
Judge’s Order Fast-Tracks Leandro Remedy for Education Opportunity, CHARLOTTE POST (Jan. 25, 2020,
9:09 PM), http://www.thecharlottepost.com/news/2020/01/25/local-state/judge-s-order-fast-tracksleandro-remedy-for-education-opportunity/ [https://perma.cc/Y4NE-MWCN].
191. N.C. OFFICE OF STATE HUMAN RES., STATE HUMAN RESOURCES MANUAL: UNLAWFUL
WORKPLACE HARASSMENT § 1, at 15 (Apr. 2019), https://files.nc.gov/ncoshr/documents/
files/Unlawful_Workplace_Harassment_Policy_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3P7-3NK2].
192. N.C. OFFICE OF STATE HUMAN RES., STATE HUMAN RESOURCES MANUAL: EMPLOYEE
GRIEVANCE POLICY § 7, at 29 (Dec. 23, 2015), https://files.nc.gov/ncoshr/documents/
files/Employee_Grievance_Policy-Agency_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/53UP-GKCG].
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interns, and pages who experience harassment may report to either their
supervisor, the Speaker of the House or the Senate Pro Tempore, or the
Legislative Ethics Committee. 193 None of these options are confidential, and
despite numerous failures by the Legislative Ethics Committee to investigate
alleged harassment, 194 these reporting policies have not been updated since
2010. 195
In 2018, news broke that Representative Duane Hall had engaged in
“persistent sexual innuendo” and “repeated, unwanted sexual overtures,”
including kissing two women without their consent. 196 One woman who applied
to work as his Legislative Assistant in 2016 was told that he could not hire her
unless she “gained 100 pounds” because she was “too pretty.” 197 Five other
sources detailed harassment that predated the 2016 encounter but requested
anonymity in the press “for fear of repercussions in their current jobs” as
legislative staffers. 198 Still, no formal complaints were filed against Rep. Hall. 199
The legislature’s “unlawful workplace harassment policy” would have required
victims of harassment to report Representative Hall, a Democrat, to either
Speaker of the House Tim Moore, a Republican, or to Representative Hall’s
colleagues in the Legislative Ethics Committee. 200 Neither reporting avenue
would have allowed the confidentiality sought by the five sources who reported
the harassment to the press. 201
Like in the example above, this reporting policy may violate the rights of
legislative employees under the fruits clause. First, employees could likely show
that the reporting policy places a barrier on their ability to pursue their chosen
occupation. The General Assembly is a unique work environment for those
hoping to participate in researching, shaping, and helping citizens navigate

193. N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PERSONNEL MANUAL, UNLAWFUL WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
POLICY § 7 at 5–6 (2006); Memorandum from Steve Goss, N.C. Senator, and Rick Glazier, N.C.
Representative, Co-Chairs of the Legislative Ethics Comm., to Members of the Gen. Assembly (Mar.
9, 2010), http://mediad.publicbroadcasting.net/p/wunc/files/ethic_guideline_9_creating_respectful
_workplace.pdf?_ga=2.23090106.161351228.1512998410-1374912147.1505836178
[https://perma.cc/
5QDJ-B4CV].
194. See Jeff Tiberii, Does A ‘Good Ol’ Boy’ Culture Pervade The North Carolina General Assembly?,
WUNC (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.wunc.org/post/does-good-ol-boy-culture-pervade-northcarolina-general-assembly#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/A6T8-8CB2].
195. See H.B. 817, 2019 Gen. Assemb., 2019–2020 Sess. (N.C. 2019) (proposing to create an
independent, confidential reporting scheme for legislative employees).
196. Billy Ball, Top Democrats Call on Rep. Duane Hall To Resign Amid Sexual Misconduct Allegations,
N.C. POL’Y WATCH (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2018/02/28/top-democrats-callrep-duane-hall-resign-amid-sexual-misconduct-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/9XTE-QA6U].
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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public policy. 202 Sexism and harassment create a complete barrier to this work
for some individuals—at least one woman was denied employment based on her
appearance—and “are associated with negative outcomes such as decreased job
satisfaction, lower organizational commitment, withdrawing from work, ill
physical and mental health, and even symptoms of post-traumatic stress
disorder.” 203 Victims are less likely to report harassment due to fear of
retaliation, especially when reporting avenues are not confidential. 204 When
reports are suppressed, harassers avoid liability and are able to continue their
behavior without repercussion. Thus, nonconfidential reporting policies like the
one here could decrease reporting and enable harassment.
Second, depending on specific circumstances, a plaintiff-employee injured
by the reporting policy may not have adequate alternatives under state law.
Though North Carolina and federal employment law prohibit sexual
harassment, 205 employees may not be able to win relief against a state legislator.
Legislators acting in their official capacities enjoy “absolute immunity” in
certain circumstances. 206 When legislators have acted outside their official
capacities, the state may not be vicariously liable for their actions. 207 And the
fruits clause may prohibit more sexual harassment than state or federal law—a
question that has not been considered by any court.
Third, if a hypothetical plaintiff could meet her burden in steps one and
two, the state could likely meet its burden in step three. The state’s
nonconfidential reporting process balances the state’s valid objective of
reducing sexual harassment with its goal of ensuring that the accused can
confront accusers. Further, by allowing legislators to internally regulate their
colleagues’ behavior, the policy ensures that legislators are not beholden to
unelected investigators.

202. See, e.g., Legal Analyst I (Local Government Law Staff Attorney), N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
https://careers.ncleg.net/PostingDetails/1081 [https://perma.cc/QM47-SPMD] (“The nonpartisan
staff of the Legislative Analysis Division provide legal analysis, policy research, general information,
and legislative drafting services for all 170 Legislators of the North Carolina General Assembly.”).
203. Chelsea R. Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and
Consequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 127, 127 (2007).
204. Expectation of retaliation and nonconfidentiality are leading reasons employees do not file
sexual harassment claims. See Carly McCann, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & M.V. Lee Badgett,
Employer’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, U. MASS. AMHERST: CTR. FOR EMP. EQUITY (Dec. 2018),
https://www.umass.edu/employmentequity/employers-responses-sexual-harassment
[https://perma.cc/5K9V-XJZX].
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2(a) (2019).
206. TREY ALLEN, IMMUNITY OF THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM LAWSUITS
IN NORTH CAROLINA 8 (2013) (first citing Scott v. Granville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983);
and then citing Vereen v. Holden, 121 N.C. App. 779, 468 S.E.2d 471 (1996)).
207. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS
(June 18, 1999), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [https://perma.cc/S5QT-8UVE].
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At step four, though, a court could find that the policy is not reasonably
necessary. Factor one weighs in favor of the government: legislative jobs are
often partisan and may demand advanced legal training. Factor two weighs in
favor of the employee: the policy is not well tailored since the Legislative Ethics
Committee may dispose of complaints before accused legislators can confront
accusers at a formal hearing, 208 and legislators may be criminally investigated in
other contexts by unelected third parties. 209 These facts show that the
government’s interest is relatively small (factor three), because its objectives are
not truly affected under its current plan, while employees’ interests (factor four)
are high in reducing sexual harassment and avoiding retaliation for reporting
harassment. Factors five and six strongly weigh in favor of the plaintiff because
(as discussed) the legislature’s policy is in conflict with the general state
reporting policy. Finally, factor seven weighs in favor of the government,
because a court interference with the legislative branch’s regulation of its own
employees directly implicates the separation of powers. Still, factors one and
seven are outweighed by the other five. A court could find this reporting policy
to be a constitutional violation.
CONCLUSION
In Tully v. City of Wilmington, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
extended a long recognized fundamental right to “pursue [one’s] chosen
profession” free from unreasonable government interference as applying to
public sector employees. 210 While the court’s holding was limited to the facts of
that case, its reasoning gives public employees a new avenue to seek relief when
they are unreasonably burdened by their employers.
The Tully court’s reasoning is not limited to North Carolina. While a
guarantee to “the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor” 211 is unique to the
North Carolina Constitution, twenty-six states have similar protections,
including a right to “the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry,” 212 “to
be rewarded for industry,” 213 and to the “means of acquiring . . . property.” 214
208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-103.1(c)–(h2) (2019).
209. Id. § 120-103.1(b)(2)c.; see Dan Kane, Prosecutor Asks SBI To Review Allegations Raised About
House Speaker Moore, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Oct. 8, 2018, 11:11 AM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article219586045.html
[https://perma.cc/4KGN-7ZEV
(dark archive)].
210. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215–16 (2018).
211. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
212. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 2 (Westlaw through Nov. 2018 amendments); see also ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through 2019 First Reg. Sess. and 2019 First Spec. Sess. of the 31st Leg.)
(stating “the enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry”).
213. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Westlaw through 2018 legislation).
214. VA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 1
(Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2020 Reg.
Sess.) (“acquiring, possessing and protecting property”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Westlaw through
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Like in North Carolina, these provisions have been similarly interpreted as
protections against unreasonable regulation. 215 While the exact reasoning used
by the Tully court will not make sense in every state, other states may be
receptive to arguments rooting protections for public employees in their
constitutions.
Though public jobs remain desirable for their relative stability and
guaranteed benefits, 216 budget cuts, 217 increased demands, 218 and political
amendments adopted through the Nov. 5, 2019 election) (same); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Westlaw
through 2018 legislation) (“to acquire, possess and protect property”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1
(Westlaw through effective legislation through Chapter 95 of the 2020 Second Reg. Sess. of the 65th
Idaho Leg.) (“acquiring, possessing and protecting property”); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw
through Nov. 8, 2016 General Election) (same); ME. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through Chapter
586 of the 2019 Second Reg. Sess. of the 129th Leg.) (same); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I (Westlaw
through amendments approved Feb. 1, 2020) (same); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Westlaw through
2019 Sess.) (same); N.H. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Westlaw through Chapter 7 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.)
(same); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through amendments approved at Nov. 5, 2019 election)
(same); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4 (Westlaw through amendments approved at the general election held
Nov. 6, 2018) (same); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through the end of the 80th Reg. Sess. 2019)
(same); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through File 29 of 133rd General Assemb. 2019–2020)
(same); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through Chapter 1 of the 2020 Gen. Sess.) (“to acquire,
possess and protect property”); VT. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through acts 1–85, and 99 of the
Adjourned Sess. of the 2019–2020 Vermont General Assemb.) (“acquiring, possessing and protecting
property”). Other states use a similar formulation. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Westlaw through end
of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (“acquiring and protecting property”); KY. CONST. § 1 (Westlaw through
emergency effective legislation through Chapter 5 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.) (same); S.D. CONST. art.
VI, § 1 (Westlaw through 2019 Sess. Laws) (same). Some states have even broader phrasing. See ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 2 (Westlaw through the end of the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 92d Arkansas General
Assemb.) (“acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation”); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1
(Westlaw through amendments approved at the general election held Nov. 8, 2018) (same); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through Nov. 5, 2019 General Election) (same). But see also LA. CONST.
art. I, § 4 (Westlaw through amendments through Jan. 1, 2020) (“Every person has the right to acquire,
own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable
statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.”).
215. See, e.g., Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 452–53 (Alaska 1963) (striking down a commercialfisherman licensing scheme on state constitutional grounds); Grondin v. Town of Hinsdale, 451 A.2d
1299, 1301 (N.H. 1982) (“[The state constitution places] limitations upon the so-called police power
. . . and nullif[ies] arbitrary legislation passed under the guise of that power.”); Cryan v. State, 583
P.2d 1122, 1124 (Okla. 1978) (“To sustain encroachment on an individual’s liberty, there should be an
obvious and real connection between the regulation and its purpose to protect the public welfare and
that this purpose can be served in no less restrictive means.”).
216. Carole Moore, Government Jobs Offer Good Pay Benefits, BANKRATE (May 5, 2008),
https://www.bankrate.com/finance/jobs-careers/government-jobs-offer-good-pay-benefits.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RXX5-YSBN].
217. See, e.g., Michael Leachman, Timeline: 5 Years of Kansas’ Tax-Cut Disaster, CTR. ON BUDGET
& POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 24, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/timeline-5-years-of-kansas-tax-cutdisaster [https://perma.cc/3UMD-DJVC] (describing the impact of severe budget cuts on Kansas’s
public employees).
218. See, e.g., Why Class Size Matters Today, NAT’L COUNCIL TCHRS. ENG. (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www2.ncte.org/statement/why-class-size-matters/ [https://perma.cc/7UT2-UUYB] (“Today
public schools employ 250,000 fewer people than before the recession of 2008–09, while enrollment
has increased by 800,000, and class sizes in many schools are at record highs.”).
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gamesmanship 219 have depressed morale across the country and made
recruitment and retention of public employees even more challenging. 220 In
addition to political and legislative action, public employees who suffer
unreasonable treatment at the hands of their employers ought to have a remedy
in court. Creative lawyers and judges should answer Justice Brennan’s call and
use these often-overlooked state constitutional provisions to protect public
servants from unreasonable, unlawful employer abuse.
JAMES W. WHALEN **

219. See, e.g., Ivonne Rovira, Opinion, Teachers, Make Matt Bevin See Red. Be in Frankfort Friday
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concerning teacher pensions).
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** Thanks to Professor Jeffrey Hirsch, Shannon Smith, Hunter Huffman, Miranda Goot, Cait
Bell-Butterfield, Taylor Rodney, Caroline Reinwald, Nathan Wilson, Alexandra Franklin, Sydney
Teng, and Jordan Briggs for their thoughtful edits and improvements. Thanks to many relatives and
ancestors who have shown that a career in the dedicated employ of state government can be as
honorable and fluffing as it is hard. And special thanks to my wife, Anna Whalen, for her loving
support, inspiration, and her tireless and courageous work as a school counselor for nearly five-hundred
middle schoolers.

98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1575 (2020)

1606

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

